ubuntu@localhost:~$ cat /snaps/mosquitto.sideload/current/meta/package.yaml                           
architectures:
- amd64
binaries:
- exec: command-publish.wrapper
  name: publish
- caps:
  - network-listener
  exec: command-subscribe.wrapper
  name: subscribe
  security-override:
    read-paths:
    - /etc/hosts.deny
    - /etc/hosts.allow
name: mosquitto
services:
- caps:
  - network-listener
  - network-service
  daemon: simple
  description: service for mosquitto
  name: mosquitto
  start: command-mosquitto.wrapper
version: 0.1

ubuntu@localhost:~$ cat /var/lib/snappy/apparmor/profiles/mosquitto.sideload_mosquitto_IKfKaFPNFQGA 
# Description: Allows access to app-specific directories and basic runtime
# Usage: common

# vim:syntax=apparmor

#include <tunables/global>

# Specified profile variables
@{APP_APPNAME}="mosquitto"
@{APP_ID_DBUS}="mosquitto_2esideload_5fmosquitto_5fIKfKaFPNFQGA"
@{APP_PKGNAME_DBUS}="mosquitto_2esideload"
@{APP_PKGNAME}="mosquitto.sideload"
@{APP_VERSION}="IKfKaFPNFQGA"
@{INSTALL_DIR}="{/snaps,/gadget}"
# Deprecated:
@{CLICK_DIR}="{/snaps,/gadget}"

profile "mosquitto.sideload_mosquitto_IKfKaFPNFQGA" (attach_disconnected) {
  #include <abstractions/base>
  #include <abstractions/consoles>
  #include <abstractions/openssl>

  # for python apps/services
  #include <abstractions/python>
  /usr/bin/python{,2,2.[0-9]*,3,3.[0-9]*} ixr,
  deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/ w,              # noisy
  deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/**.pyc.[0-9]* w,

  # for perl apps/services
  #include <abstractions/perl>
  /usr/bin/perl{,5*} ixr,

# TODO: we must remove these since things like 'container-management' will be
# broken if we have explicit denies. However, the development tools need to be
# clear that these can't be allowed.
  # Explicitly deny ptrace for now since it can be abused to break out of the
  # seccomp sandbox. https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/18/823
#  audit deny ptrace (trace),

  # Explicitly deny capability mknod so apps can't create devices
#  audit deny capability mknod,

  # Explicitly deny mount, remount and umount so apps can't modify things in
  # their namespace
#  audit deny mount,
#  audit deny remount,
#  audit deny umount,
                                                                                                                                                                                                  [259/4653]
  # for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
  # user-specific bash files
  /bin/bash ixr,
  /bin/dash ixr,
  /etc/bash.bashrc r,
  /etc/{passwd,group,nsswitch.conf} r,  # very common
  /etc/libnl-3/{classid,pktloc} r,      # apps that use libnl
  /var/lib/extrausers/{passwd,group} r,
  /etc/profile r,
  /usr/share/terminfo/** r,
  /etc/inputrc r,
  deny @{HOME}/.inputrc r,
  # Common utilities for shell scripts
  /{,usr/}bin/{,g,m}awk ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/basename ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bunzip2 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzcat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzdiff ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzgrep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzip2 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chmod ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cmp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cpio ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cut ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/date ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/diff{,3} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dirname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/echo ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/{,e,f,r}grep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/env ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/expr ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/false ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/find ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/fmt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getopt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/groups ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/gzip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/head ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/hostname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/id ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/igawk ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/kill ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ldd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/less{,file,pipe} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ln ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/line ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/link ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/logger ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ls ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/md5sum ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mkdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mktemp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/more ixr,                                                                                                                                                                           [202/4653]
  /{,usr/}bin/mv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/openssl ixr, # may cause harmless capability block_suspend denial
  /{,usr/}bin/pgrep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/printenv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/printf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ps ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/pwd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/readlink ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/realpath ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rev ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rm ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rmdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sed ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/seq ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sleep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sort ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tac ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tail ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tar ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tee ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/test ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tempfile ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tset ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/touch ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tr ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/true ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uniq ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unlink ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unxz ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unzip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/vdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/wc ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/which ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/xargs ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/xz ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/yes ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zcat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/z{,e,f}grep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zipgrep ixr,

  # uptime
  /{,usr/}bin/uptime ixr,
  @{PROC}/uptime r,
  @{PROC}/loadavg r,
  # this is an information leak
  deny /{,var/}run/utmp r,

  # java
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/ r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/fd/ r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/auxv r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/version_signature r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/version r,
  @{PROC}/sys/vm/zone_reclaim_mode r,                                                                                                                                                             [145/4653]
  /etc/lsb-release r,
  /sys/devices/**/read_ahead_kb r,
  /sys/devices/system/cpu/** r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/defrag r,
  # NOTE: this leaks running process and java seems to want it, but operates
  # ok without it. Deny for now to silence the denial but we could allow
  # owner match until AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly.
  deny @{PROC}/@{pid}/cmdline r,
  #owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cmdline r,

  # Miscellaneous accesses
  /etc/mime.types r,
  @{PROC}/ r,
  /etc/{,writable/}hostname r,
  /etc/{,writable/}localtime r,
  /etc/{,writable/}timezone r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/status r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/hostname r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/osrelease r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/file-max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/uuid r,

  # Eases hardware assignment (doesn't give anything away)
  /etc/udev/udev.conf r,
  /sys/       r,
  /sys/bus/   r,
  /sys/class/ r,

  # this leaks interface names and stats, but not in a way that is traceable
  # to the user/device
  @{PROC}/net/dev r,

  # Read-only for the install directory
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{APP_PKGNAME}/                   r,
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/    r,
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/**  mrklix,

  # Don't log noisy python denials (see LP: #1496895 for more details)
  deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{APP_PKGNAME}/**/__pycache__/             w,
  deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/@{APP_PKGNAME}/**/__pycache__/*.pyc.[0-9]* w,

  # Read-only home area for other versions
  owner @{HOME}/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/                  r,
  owner @{HOME}/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/**                mrkix,
  owner @{HOME}/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/                  r,
  owner @{HOME}/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/**                mrkix,

  # Writable home area for this version.
  owner @{HOME}/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/   w,
  owner @{HOME}/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/** wl,
  owner @{HOME}/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/   w,
  owner @{HOME}/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/** wl,

  # Read-only system area for other versions
  /var/lib/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/   r,
  /var/lib/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/** mrkix,
  /var/lib/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/   r,
  /var/lib/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/** mrkix,

  # TODO: the write on these is needed in case they doesn't exist, but means an
  # app could adjust inode data and affect rollbacks.
  owner @{HOME}/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/         w,
  /var/lib/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/                    w,
  owner @{HOME}/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/         w,
  /var/lib/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/                    w,

  # Writable system area only for this version
  /var/lib/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/   w,
  /var/lib/apps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/** wl,
  /var/lib/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/   w,
  /var/lib/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/** wl,

  # The ubuntu-core-launcher creates an app-specific private restricted /tmp
  # and will fail to launch the app if something goes wrong. As such, we can
  # simply allow full access to /tmp.
  /tmp/   r,
  /tmp/** mrwlkix,

  # Also do the same for shm
  /{dev,run}/shm/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/                  r,
  /{dev,run}/shm/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/**                rk,
  /{dev,run}/shm/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/   r,
  /{dev,run}/shm/snaps/@{APP_PKGNAME}/@{APP_VERSION}/** mrwlkix,

  # Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via an
  # abstract or anonymous socket
  unix peer=(label=@{APP_PKGNAME}_*),

  # Allow apps from the same package to signal each other via signals
  signal peer=@{APP_PKGNAME}_*,

  # for 'udevadm trigger --verbose --dry-run --tag-match=snappy-assign'
  /{,s}bin/udevadm ixr,
  /etc/udev/udev.conf r,
  /{,var/}run/udev/tags/snappy-assign/ r,
  @{PROC}/cmdline r,
  @{PROC}/[0-9]*/stat r,
  /sys/devices/**/uevent r,

  # LP: #1447237: adding '--property-match=SNAPPY_APP=<pkgname>' to the above
  # requires:
  #   /run/udev/data/* r,
  # but that reveals too much about the system and cannot be granted to apps
  # by default at this time.

  # For convenience, allow apps to see what is in /dev even though cgroups
  # will block most access
  /dev/ r,
  /dev/**/ r,
                                                                                                                                                                                                   [33/4653]
  # Do the same with /sys/devices and /sys/class to help people using hw-assign
  /sys/devices/ r,
  /sys/devices/**/ r,
  /sys/class/ r,
  /sys/class/**/ r,

  # No abstractions specified

  # Rules specified via caps (policy groups)
  # Description: Can access the network as a server.
  # Usage: common
  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
  #include <abstractions/ssl_certs>

  @{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
  @{PROC}/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range r,

  # LP: #1496906: java apps need these for some reason and they leak the IPv6 IP
  # addresses and routes. Until we find another way to handle them (see the bug
  # for some options), we need to allow them to avoid developer confusion.
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/net/if_inet6 r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/net/ipv6_route r,

  # java apps request this but seem to work fine without it. Netlink sockets
  # are used to talk to kernel subsystems though and since apps run as root,
  # allowing blanket access needs to be carefully considered. Kernel capabilities
  # checks (which apparmor mediates) *should* be enough to keep abuse down,
  # however Linux capabilities can be quite broad and there have been CVEs in
  # this area. The issue is complicated because reservied policy groups like
  # 'network-admin' and 'network-firewall' have legitimate use for this rule,
  # however a network facing server shouldn't typically be running with these
  # policy groups. For now, explicitly deny to silence the denial. LP: #1499897
  deny network netlink dgram,
  # Description: Can access the network as a server.
  # Usage: common
  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
  #include <abstractions/ssl_certs>

  @{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
  @{PROC}/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range r,

  # LP: #1496906: java apps need these for some reason and they leak the IPv6 IP
  # addresses and routes. Until we find another way to handle them (see the bug
  # for some options), we need to allow them to avoid developer confusion.
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/net/if_inet6 r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/net/ipv6_route r,

  # java apps request this but seem to work fine without it. Netlink sockets
  # are used to talk to kernel subsystems though and since apps run as root,
  # allowing blanket access needs to be carefully considered. Kernel capabilities
  # checks (which apparmor mediates) *should* be enough to keep abuse down,
  # however Linux capabilities can be quite broad and there have been CVEs in
  # this area. The issue is complicated because reservied policy groups like
  # 'network-admin' and 'network-firewall' have legitimate use for this rule,
  # however a network facing server shouldn't typically be running with these
  # policy groups. For now, explicitly deny to silence the denial. LP: #1499897

  # No read paths specified

  # No write paths specified